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Brexidiocy	and	Somalia
Somalia	is	a	sad	illustration	of	how	Brexit	is	tangibly	reducing	British	influence	internationally.	The	general	rule	of
thumb	for	EU	policy	in	Africa	has	been	that	it	is	determined	one	third	by	France,	one	third	by	the	UK	and	one	third
by	the	rest.	This	gave	the	UK	disproportionate	influence.	The	UK	has	taken	the	lead	on	the	European	policy
towards	Somalia,	making	it	the	flagship	of	British	policy	in	Africa.	But	its	influence	has	depended	heavily	on	the	EU.
EU	naval	force	patrolling	the	Somalia	coast,	Operation	Atalanta
The	UK	has	had	the	lead	in	Europe’s	Naval	Force	Operation	Atalanta	(EUNAVFOR)	against	piracy	in	Somalia.	In
June,	the	EU’s	Political	and	Security	Committee	transferred	command	and	oversight	responsibilities	from	Britain	to
Spain	and	France.	The	decision	was	confirmed	by	the	EU	Council	in	July.	Spanish	vice	admiral	Antonio	Martorell
Lacave	will	take	over	from	Gen.	Charlie	Stickland	as	the	commander	of	the	operation	on	29	March	2019.	The
command	HQ	in	Northwood	(UK)	will	be	relocated	to	Rota	(Spain),	except	for	the	Maritime	Security	Centre-Horn	of
Africa	(MSCHOA),	which	will	be	located	in	Brest	(France).
EU	financing	for	AMISOM
The	EU	has	provided	over	1.6bn	euros	to	the	African	Union	Mission	in	Somalia	(AMISOM)	since	2007,	which	is
only	one	component	of	its	overall	security	and	development	engagement	in	Somalia;	this	includes	three	missions:
the	EU	Naval	Force	Operation	Atalanta	(EU	NAVFOR);	the	EU	military	training	mission	in	Somalia	(EUTM
Somalia),	and	the	EU	civilian	maritime	security	capacity-building	mission	(EUCAP	Nestor).
AMISOM	is	the	crucial	element	in	the	Somali	security	arena.	There	is	currently	a	plan	to	scale	it	down	but	this
decision	is	driven	by	necessity	rather	than	strategy.	The	three-year	timeframe	(2018-2020)	to	steadily	hand	over
military	and	security	responsibility	to	the	Somalia	National	Army	and	Police	Force	was	seen	as	far	too	short	by	most
analysts.	Key	in	making	a	successful	transition	is	the	need	to	ensure	AMISOM	has	sufficient	resources	and
capacity	to	seriously	degrade	Al	Shabaab’s	presence,	as	well	as	to	ensure	Somalia	has	developed	its	own	capable,
legitimate	and	inclusive	security	and	policing	forces.	Amongst	many	other	factors	this	requires	a	strong	working
relationship	between	the	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	and	the	Federal	Member	States.	Most	of	these	factors
are	not	in	place	and	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	recent	Garowe	communique,	which	signals	the	intent	of	the
Member	States	to	develop	a	more	integrated	intelligence	and	security	plan,	results	in	significant	developments	in
this	area.
Currently	the	EU	funds	80	percent	of	AMISOM	costs	through	its	Africa	Peace	Facility	(APF).	(Until	2017	it	was	90
percent.)	This	is	by	far	the	largest	allocation	of	EU	APF	funds.	Following	Brexit	this	cannot	be	sustained.	First,	the
APF	will	be	reduced	because	of	the	loss	of	the	UK’s	contribution.	The	APF	does	not	actually	permit	funding	of
offensive	military	operations	as	such,	which	includes	those	that	AMISOM	routinely	conducts,	so	a	formula	has	been
found	whereby	a	certain	proportion	of	the	APF	is	allocated	to	overhead	and	miscellaneous	expenses,	which	then
goes	for	funding	such	operations.	This	margin	will	disappear	with	the	UK’s	vanishing	act.	Second,	the
disproportionate	share	of	APF	funding	going	to	Somalia	(rather	than	to	French	security	priorities	in	the	Sahel,
Central	African	Republic	and	elsewhere)	is	possible	insofar	as	the	UK	has	a	leading	role	within	the	EU.	Therefore,
after	March,	it	seems	that	the	UK	will	be	left	holding	the	pen	for	Somali	at	the	UN	Security	Council	and	possibly
continuing	to	host	Somali	conferences	in	London,	but	insofar	as	any	security	is	to	be	provided	by	international
forces,	the	Foreign	Secretary	will	have	to	go	begging	for	leftovers	in	Brussels.
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